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ERTAINLY the most significant development in the area of com-
petitive torts during the survey period was the enactment by the
legislature of the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act of 1983
(TFEAA).I The TFEAA represents a wholesale revision of the Texas anti-
trust laws, which have remained relatively unchanged since 1903. A de-
tailed examination of the TFEAA is beyond the scope of this survey
article, but an overview may be helpful to the practitioner who may have
had occasional contact with the former state antitrust statutes and who will
undoubtedly have far more contact with the TFEAA.
Generally, the prescriptive provisions of the TFEAA are found in the
first four subsections of section 15.05, which parallel sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act 2 and sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act.3 These sections
prohibit combinations in restraint of trade, monopolization and attempted
monopolization, exclusive dealing arrangements, and certain acquisitions
and mergers.4 The TFEAA expressly states that, with one important ex-
ception discussed below,5 the act shall be construed in harmony with fed-
eral judicial interpretations of comparable federal antitrust statutes.6
Given this directive, the Texas courts should abandon the confusing and
inconsistent assortment of cases decided under the prior statutes and begin
anew with decisions that follow federal precedents.
The TFEAA allows the state to bring civil suits for civil penalties, which
may range up to one million dollars for a corporation,7 and for injunctive
* B.A., Kansas State University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at
Law, Carrington, Coleman, Sloman & Blumenthal, Dallas, Texas.
1. Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act, ch. 519, §§ 1-3, 1983 Tex. Gen Laws 3010
(codified at TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.01-.26 (Vernon Supp. 1984)) [hereinafter
cited as TFEAA].
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1982).
3. Id. §§ 14, 18.
4. TFEAA § 15.05(a)-(d). The TFEAA also contains provisions relating to the right to
work and labor union activities. Id. § 15.05(e)-(f).
5. The TFEAA will only be construed in harmony with constructions of federal stat-
utes to the extent such constructions are consistent with the objectives of the Act. Id.
§ 15.04; see infra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
6. TFEAA § 15.04.
7. Id. § 15.20(a).
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relief.8 In the case of an unlawful merger or acquisition the court may
order divestiture in a government action upon a finding that "no other
remedy will eliminate the lessening of competition." 9 Criminal sanctions
are also available under the Act.' 0
Private rights of action" are available to any person or governmental
entity "whose business or property has been injured by reason of any con-
duct declared unlawful in Subsection (a), (b), or (c) of Section 15.05 of this
Act.' 12 Under the state antitrust statutes prior to the TFEAA only actual
damages could be recovered.' 3 Consequently, violations of the prior state
antitrust laws were most commonly asserted either as pendent claims in
federal antitrust actions in federal courts or defensively in suits to collect
debts arising from courses of dealing that allegedly violated the antitrust
laws.14 The TFEAA changes prior law by allowing treble damages in pri-
vate suits when the trier of fact finds the unlawful conduct "willful or
flagrant."' 5 The availability of such damages will certainly increase both
offensive use of the state antitrust provisions and the number of antitrust
actions brought in the state courts. Plaintiffs should bear in mind, how-
ever, that any action found by the court to be groundless and brought in
bad faith, or for the purpose of harassment, may result in an award of
attorneys' fees, court costs, and other expenses to the defendant.'
6
The practitioner will probably encounter the TFEAA in the form of civil
investigative demands issued by the Texas attorney general's office. 17
Broadly stated, the TFEAA allows the attorney general to utilize all of the
discovery tools available in civil litigation, prior to the institution of a law-
suit, in order to collect information or documentary material that is "rele-
vant to a civil antitrust investigation."1 8 The provisions setting forth the
8. Id. § 15.21(b).
9. Id. § 15.20(b).
10. Id. § 15.22.
II. Private plaintiffs may seek damages and/or injunctive relief. Id. § 15.2 1(a)-(b).
12. Id. § 15.21(a)(1). It is important to note that the quoted language tracks the provi-
sions of § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982), with respect to parties who have
standing to assert antitrust violations. The legislature apparently intended no private right
of action to exist for a violation or a threatened violation of § 15.05(d) relating to mergers
and acquisitions. Undoubtedly, however, conduct that would violate § 15.05(d) would also
violate § 15.05(a), and a private cause of action could be brought under the latter subsection.
13. Competitive & Trade Practices Act, ch. 785, § 15.32, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 2553,
2566-67 (repealed (1983).
14. Climatic Air Distribs. v. Climatic Air Sales, Inc., 162 Tex. 237, 345 S.W.2d 702
(1961); Patrizi v. McAninch, 153 Tex. 389, 269 S.W.2d 343 (1954.); Grand Prize Distrib. Co.
v. Gulf Brewing Co., 267 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Civ. App-San Antonio 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
15. TFEAA § 15.21(a)(1).
16. Id. § 15.21(a)(3).
17. 1d. § 15.10. It is hoped that the attorney general's office will utilize the broad civil
investigative demand powers in lieu of filing lawsuits and conducting the investigation
through judicial discovery.
18. Id. § 15.10(b). Curiously, the legislature did not authorize the issuance of a civil
investigative demand to "a proprietorship or partnership whose annual gross income does
not exceed $5 million." Id. This exception does not seem well reasoned. No justification
exists for a corporation having annual gross income of $100,000 to be subject to a demand
while a partnership in the same line of business with gross annual income of $1,000,000 is
not. More fundamentally, why any person or entity with relevant information or document
[Vol. 38
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procedures governing such demands are complex and not completely con-
sistent with respect to document demands, written interrogatories, and
depositions.' 9 The practitioner should carefully review the provisions of
section 15.10 of the TFEAA when confronted with an investigative de-
mand. A party receiving a demand may protect its rights only by taking
timely procedural steps specified in the statute. 20 In addition, counsel
should be aware of the availability of broad "transactional" immunity that
the TFEAA accords a person exposed to self-incrimination by replying to
an investigative demand. 2'
Finally, the TFEAA includes a mechanism for filing a declaratory judg-
ment action by a person 22 who is "uncertain of whether or not his or her
action or proposed action violates or will violate the prohibitions con-
tained in Section 15.05 .... ,,23 The time-consuming nature of such an
action, however, together with the severe restrictions the act places upon
the use of any declaratory judgment obtained, suggests that this provision
of the TFEAA will be utilized rarely, if ever.
The TFEAA undoubtedly represents a vast and long overdue improve-
ment in the antitrust law of this state. Gone are the inflexible and anti-
quated per se prohibitions of the former statute that often resulted in
tortuous court opinions seeking to circumvent the plainly unjust results
that would have resulted from a literal reading of the statutes. Gone, too,
is the rule that allowed a just debt to go unpaid upon a mere showing that
the debt was related to a contract that, albeit unintentionally, violated the
state antitrust laws. 24
The TFEAA is not without its troublesome points, however. Two provi-
sions of the TFEAA stand out as potentially problematic. First and fore-
most is the last clause of the "purpose" section of the Act.25 That section
provides that the TFEAA will be construed in harmony with federal inter-
pretations of comparable federal statutes but only to the extent that such
interpretations are consistent with the objective of the TFEAA to "main-
tain and promote economic competition. . . and to provide the benefits of
should be exempt from an investigative demand, as long as the demand is not unreasonably
burdensome or oppressive, is not clear.
19. For example, confidential information requested by written interrogatory or con-
tained in requested documents can be designated as containing trade secrets or confidential
information and given some protection from disclosure. Id. § 15. 10(i)(5). The Act provides
no comparable means of protecting from disclosure the same information elicited in deposi-
tion testimony.
20. Id. § 15.10(f).
21. Id. § 15.13.
22. The TFEAA excludes from its definition of "persons" who may institute such a
declaratory judgment action "a foreign corporation not having a permit or certificate of
authority to do business in this state." Id. § 15.16(a). This author submits that such an
exclusion may be of questionable constitutionality.
23. Id. § 15.16(a).
24. See, e.g., Climatic Air Distribs. v. Climatic Air Sales, Inc., 162 Tex. 237, 243, 345
S.W.2d 702, 704 (1961) (manufacturer denied recovery on contract granting exclusive area);
Patrizi v. McAninch, 153 Tex. 389, 393-94, 269 S.W.2d 343, 346-47 (1954) (seller unable to
recover royalties on contract restricting trade).
25. TFEAA § 15.04.
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that competition to consumers in the state."'26 This qualification arguably
gives Texas courts the freedom to pick and choose which federal decisions
to follow based upon each court's determination of whether the rule of the
case benefits consumers. For example, the "direct purchaser" requirement
of Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois27 clearly forecloses consumers from asserting
certain claims, such as price fixing at the wholesale level. The language of
the TFEAA seems to permit a Texas court, consistent with the stated pur-
pose section of the TFEAA, to ignore Illinois Brick and allow indirect con-
sumer-purchasers to pursue an action under the TFEAA.28 Nevertheless,
this author submits that the goal of the TFEAA to bring state law more in
line with federal law and to achieve predictability in its application 29
should weigh against discarding federal precedent on the ground that it
does not sufficiently benefit consumers.
A second important provision, the interpretation of which will have a
major impact on the development of the TFEAA, is the requirement that
the unlawful conduct be "willful" 30 or "flagrant" 31 before treble damages
are available. If the standard is relatively easy to meet, actions under the
TFEAA will proliferate; if the standard is rigorous, however, plaintiffs will
probably continue to rely on federal law with its automatic treble
damages. 32
The courts have not yet decided whether the TFEAA should apply ret-
roactively to conduct that occurred before the act became effective; 33 con-
sequently the courts may yet be required to deal with the provisions of the
old law. Mendelovitz v. Adolph Coors Co. ,34 decided during the survey
period, demonstrates the nimbleness that courts have displayed in deciding
issues under the previous Texas antitrust statute. The plaintiff in
Mendelovitz, a beer wholesaler, brought an action alleging that he was cut
off from his supply of Coors beer because he sold the beer outside of an
assigned territory. The distributor who serviced the plaintiff refused to sell
26. Id.
27. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
28. By adopting the TFEAA with its federal-like standing requirement in the face of
Illinois Brick, the legislature arguably intended to accept the indirect purchaser limitation.
29. The mere effort to determine which federal interpretation to apply to the TFEAA
should be sufficiently difficult in view of the conflicting federal decisions. The Act contains,
of course, no requirement that the Texas courts look to the law of the Fifth Circuit or any
other federal circuit. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
30. TFEAA § 15.21(a)(1). "Willful" presumably implies that the defendant intended to
violate the law, not that he merely intended to engage in the act found to be unlawful.
31. TFEAA § 15.21(a)(1). The choice of the term "flagrant" by the legislature is curi-
ous. The term has no generally recognized legal connotation, and in common parlance it
often signifies something open and notorious. The most egregious antitrust violations, on
the other hand, are often those that are covert and secret.
32. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
33. Under the Texas Code Construction Act, if it applies, the TFEAA would be given
prospective application only, and a violation of the antitrust statutes prior to the effective
date of the TFEAA would be unaffected by the revision. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art.
5429b-2, §§ 3.02, 3.11 (a) (3) (Vernon Supp. 1984). It may be: argued, however, that the
TFEAA is not governed by the Code Construction Act. Cf Knight v. International Harves-
tor Credit Corp., 627 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex. 1982).
34. 693 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1982).
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to him because of the extraterritorial sales, and other distributors refused
to sell to him because he was located outside of their territories. The plain-
tiff asserted both federal and state antitrust claims against Adolf Coors
Company and its distributor. He claimed the defendants violated the
Sherman Act by imposing territorial restrictions and by combining to boy-
cott him. He based his state law claim on the Texas rule prohibiting a
manufacturer from allocating exclusive territories to its distributors. 35 The
Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's directed verdict in the defendants'
favor on the federal claims based upon a "rule of reason" analysis. 36 The
court had to deal differently with the state antitrust claims, however, be-
cause a "rule of reason" analysis was at least facially unavailable under the
old statute.37 Prior to the TFEAA, granting the exclusive right to sell a
product within a given territory was per se illegal under state law.38 Al-
though the contract in question did not on its face grant an exclusive terri-
tory, the plaintiff in Mendelovitz claimed that Coors accomplished the
same effect by limiting a distributor's sales to a certain territory and ap-
pointing only one distributor per territory. The court circumvented the
application of the state statute, however, by holding that, even accepting
the plaintiff's argument, the exclusive territory restrictions were not the
cause in fact of plaintiffs injury.39 The court reasoned that even with
more than one distributor in the plaintiffs area, none of them could have
sold to him because of the plaintiffs territorial violations. 40 The court's
reasoning is not a model of clarity. The author hopes that the TFEAA will
reduce the need for such awkwardness in dealing with Texas antitrust law.
B. Use of Trade Secrets
In Zoecon Industries v. American Stockman Tag Co.41 the defendants
prepared a list of their employer's customers and subsequently used this
list to solicit sales for their own company. Ninety-four percent of the new
company's sales were to customers on this list. The Fifth Circuit held that
the use of a "customer list" of one's former employer violates Texas com-
mon law when (1) the former employees are under a duty not to disclose
the list, and (2) the list contains information not generally available to the
public. 42 The court found the first element of this test easily satisfied in
Zoecon because the employees had enjoyed a confidential relationship
35. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.03 (Vernon 1968) (amended 1983).
36. 693 F.2d at 575. The rule of reason analysis requires the trier of fact to weigh all the
circumstances of the case in determining whether the restrictive practice is an unreasonable
restraint on competition.
37. Climatic Air Distribs. v. Climatic Air Sales, Inc., 162 Tex. 237, 243, 345 S.W.2d 702,
706 (1961); Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. Houck, 88 Tex. 184, 190, 30 S.W. 869, 870
(1895).
38. Climatic Air Distribs. v. Climatic Air Sales, Inc., 162 Tex. 237, 243, 345 S.W.2d 702,
706 (1961).
39. 693 F.2d at 578.
40. Id.
41. 713 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1983).
42. Id. at 1179. The court noted that the requirement that the information not be gen-
erally available to others in the trade is an element added by Texas law to the traditional
1984]
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with their former employer and, in addition, had executed employment
agreements containing restrictions on the disclosure of confidential infor-
mation following termination of their employment. 43 The second element
was also satisfied, the court concluded, because the customers in the trade
involved were not easily identifiable and the list contained information
about the particular needs of each customer.44 The court therefore af-
firmed the trial court's award of a permanent injunction and exemplary
damages.Zoecon illustrates a point of practice worth noting. Under Texas law a
trade secret must in fact be secret; in other words, it must not be generally
known or ascertainable by others in the same business.45 Thus, if a per-
son's customers or potential customers could be easily ascertained by those
in the trade (as, for example, all restaurants are customers or potential
customers of a wholesale food market) a mere list of the customers' names
would not be protected. The same list may achieve the status of a trade
secret, however, if it contains items of information regarding the cus-
tomer's or potential customer's business that could be ascertained only
from dealing with or attempting to deal with the customer.4 6
C Interference with Prospective Contractual Relationships
In two cases decided during the survey period the Fifth Circuit ad-
dressed the Texas common law tort of interference with prospective con-
tractual relationships. In Phillps v. Vandygrif 4 7 the court merely recited
the established Texas law that in order to establish a cause of action a
plaintiff must show "that (1) there was a reasonable probability that he
would have entered into a contractual relationship; (2) defendant acted
maliciously by intentionally preventing the relationship from occurring
with the purpose of harming plaintiff; (3) the defendant was not privileged
or justified; and (4) actual harm or damage occurred as a result. '48
The first and second elements of the test recited in Phillps were the fo-
cus of attention in Verkin v. Melroy.49 Verkin involved the tangled web of
brokers through whom commercial property often passes before sale.
Though the facts were complex, in substance the plaintiff brokers claimed
to have been deprived of a prospective contractual relationship that would
have yielded a commission on the ultimate sale of the land in issue. The
claim arose from the defendant's attempt to bypass the plaintiffs and nego-
tiate directly with the seller, agreeing to pay all commissions in exchange
definition of a trade secret. Id.; see Gaal v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 533 S.W.2d 152 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.], 1976, no writ).
43. 713 F.2d at 1178.
44. Id. at 1177.
45. Mercer v. C.A. Roberts Co., 570 F.2d 1232, 1235-39 (5th Cir. 1978).
46. 713 F.2d at 1179-80.
47. 711 F.2d 1217 (5th Cir. 1983).
48. Id. at 1230 (quoting Leonard Duckworth, Inc. v. Michael L. Field & Co., 516 F.2d
952, 956 (5th Cir. 1975)).
49. 699 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1983).
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for a reduction in the purchase price. The trial court granted the defend-
ant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that
there was no evidence to support the jury's finding of the first two elements
of the cause of action. The Fifth Circuit reversed and reinstated the jury
verdict.50
Of particular interest is the Verkin court's discussion of the requirement
that "malicious intent" be shown. The trial court had concluded that there
was no evidence that the defendant even knew of the plaintiffs and there-
fore the defendant could not have acted with the intent to block plaintiffs'
prospective contractual relationship and to harm the plaintiffs. The appel-
late court held, however, that the evidence established that the defendant
knew that someone had a prospective contractual relationship, in the form
of a contractual right to a brokerage commission, and that the defendant
had acted to cut off that prospective relationship.5' The defendant did not
have to know of the plaintiffs specific identity. Moreover, the evidence
showed that the defendant knew that but for his action some other broker
would normally receive a commission. The Fifth Circuit held such knowl-
edge sufficient to show intent to harm.5 2
II. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES
The issue of who is a consumer under the Texas Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA)53 occupied both the legislature
and the courts during the survey period. Of greatest significance is the
decision of the Texas Supreme Court in Flenniken v. Longview Bank &
Trust Co .54 The plaintiffs in Flenniken contracted with Easterwood for the
construction of a house. The plaintiffs paid Easterwood $5010 and exe-
cuted a $42,500 mechanic's lien note naming Easterwood as payee. The
note was further secured by a deed of trust that named a bank's vice presi-
dent as trustee. Easterwood assigned the note and lien to the bank in re-
turn for the bank's commitment to provide interim construction financing.
The bank made advancements, but Easterwood misappropriated the funds
and abandoned the construction. The bank foreclosed on the property.
The owners' suit challenged the foreclosure as an unconscionable course of
action in violation of the DTPA and sought treble damages and attorneys'
fees. The trial court found the bank's action unconscionable, and the bank
did not challenge the finding on appeal. Instead, the bank contended that
the plaintiffs were not consumers under the DTPA. 55 The court of appeals
held that the plaintiffs could not sue under the DTPA because, although
they were consumers as to Easterwood, they were not consumers as to the
50. Id. at 734.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 733.
53. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
54. 661 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. 1983).
55. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon Supp. 1984) defines "consumer"
as "an individual ... who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or services."
1984]
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bank.5 6 The supreme court reversed. 57
The court rejected the reasoning of the court of appeals that the foreclo-
sure was not an act that occurred in connection with the purchase of goods
or services by the plaintiffs.5 8 Instead, the supreme court held that from
the plaintiffs' perspective but one transaction took place, the purchase of a
house, and the bank's unconscionable act grew out of this transaction.5 9
The court held that the plaintiffs, therefore, "were consumers as to all par-
ties who sought to enjoy the benefits of that transaction, including the
Bank."'60 The court premised its holding on Knight v. International Har-
vester Credit Corp ,61 which the court of appeals in Flenniken had found
distinguishable. Conversely, the supreme court distinguished Riverside
National Bank v. Lewis ,62 which the court of appeals had found control-
ling.63 The supreme court's reasoning seemed sound in distinguishing Riv-
erside, but its reliance upon Knight was less secure.
While the supreme court was plainly willing to expand the scope of the
term "consumer" in the DTPA, the legislature chose to narrow it some-
what in amendments to the DTPA adopted during the survey period. Sec-
tion 17.45(4) of the DTPA now excludes from the definition of consumer
"a business consumer that has assets of $25 million or more, or that is
owned or controlled by a corporation or entity with assets of $25 million or
more. '"64 A business consumer is, in turn, "an individual, partnership, or
corporation who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or serv-
ices for commercial or business use. The term does not include this state
or a subdivision or agency of this state."'65 Apparently the legislature has
concluded that a large business is sophisticated enough not to require the
protection of the DTPA.66
56. Longview Bank & Trust Co. v. Flenniken, 642 S.W.2d 568, 570-71 (Tex. App.-
Tyler 1982).
57. 661 S.W.2d at 708.
58. Id. at 707.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 627 S.W.2d 382, 388-89 (Tex. 1982) (extension of credit in installment sales contract
simultaneously with purchase of vehicle is service contract under DTPA), citedin Flenniken,
661 S.W.2d at 706-07. The court of appeals distinguished Knight on the ground that Knight
involved only a single, nonseverable transaction, whereas the court considered the transac-
tion in Flenniken to be divisible. The court of appeals thus determined the interim construc-
tion financing was not an award of goods or services to the Flennikens by the bank. 642
S.W.2d at 571.
62. 603 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1980) (one who seeks only money in transaction is not a con-
sumer), cited in Flenniken, 661 S.W.2d at 707-08. The supreme court distinguished Riverside
on the basis that the Flennikens did not seek to borrow money but to purchase a house. 661
S.W.2d at 708.
63. 642 S.W.2d at 570.
64. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
65. Id. § 17.45(10).
66. Section 17.42 was also amended to provide that
a business consumer with assets of $5 million or more according to the most
recent financial statement of the business consumer prepared in accordance
with generally accepted accounting principles that has knowledge and experi-
ence in financial and business matters that enable it to evaluate the merits and
[Vol. 38
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In Pace v. State67 the Texas Supreme Court held that treble damages
under the DTPA are not recoverable from the Real Estate Recovery
Fund.68 Because the Fund was established to reimburse persons who suf-
fer "monetary damages" stemming from certain acts of unscrupulous real
estate dealers,69 the court held that treble damages, being in the nature of
punitive damages, are not recoverable from the Fund. 70
Finally, in Marley v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. ,71 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas addressed the question of
whether, under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, 72
the federal Arbitration Act 73 preempts the nonwaiver provision of the
DTPA74 with respect to contracts involving interstate commerce. Marley
brought an action in regard to an agreement entered into with the defend-
ants for the purchase and sale of commodities futures contracts. Among
the claims he asserted was a claim under the DTPA that Marley contended
was pendent to a federal claim under the Commodity Exchange Act. 75
The court stayed the action and directed that arbitration be conducted pur-
suant to an arbitration clause in the contract.76 The arbitrator dismissed
all the plaintiffs claims. Upon a motion by the defendants in the district
court to confirm the arbitration award, plaintiff argued that the contractual
arbitration clause was ineffective as to the DTPA claims. The court re-
jected the argument and held that the clearly conflicting provisions of the
DTPA and the federal Arbitration Act must be resolved in favor of the
federal statute.77 Thus the DTPA claims were subject to the arbitrator's
determination.
The decision in Marley was unquestionably correct. The United States
Supreme Court recently held in Southland Corp. v. Keating,78 a case ren-
dered subsequent to the Marley decision, that a nonwaiver provision in the
California Franchise Investment Law79 similar to that in the DTPA con-
flicted with section 2 of the federal Arbitration Act and violated the
Supremacy Clause.80 The Court further held that the contractual arbitra-
tion clause in issue must be enforced irrespective of whether the issue was
risks of a transaction and that is not in a significantly disparate bargaining
position may by written contract waive the provisions [of the DTPA].
Id. § 17.42. The cautious practitioner drafting a contract containing such a waiver would be
wise to include recitations and representations by the waiving party that the conditions of
§ 17.42 are met.
67. 650 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. 1983).
68. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 8 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
69. Id. § 8(l)(a).
70. 650 S.W.2d at 65.
71. 566 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
72. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
73. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
74. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.42 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
75. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982).
76. 566 F. Supp. at 334.
77. Id.
78. 104 S. Ct. 852, 79 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1984).
79. CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512 (West 1977).
80. 104 S. Ct. at 858, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 11-12.
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raised in state or federal court.81
III. EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONS
Two major developments during the survey period affect an employer's
relations with its employees. The most dramatic development came from
the legislature in the enactment of the Commission on Human Rights
Act.82 The decision of the Texas Supreme Court in Otis Engineering Corp.
v. Clark,83 on the other hand, will have a more subtle and potentially more
far-reaching effect.
The scope of this Article does not permit a detailed review of the new
Commission on Human Rights Act. Nevertheless, employers and their
counsel undoubtedly must become familiar with the Act. The Act does
two major things. First, it establishes for the first time in this state a broad
statutory prohibition against discrimination in employment on the basis of
race, color, handicap, religion, sex, national origin, or age.84 Second, the
Act establishes a state Human Rights Commission8 5 and a procedure for
administrative review of discrimination complaints. 86 The fundamental
purpose of the Act is to create a deferral agency meeting the criteria of
federal law87 and thereby to establish on the state level a mechanism for
reviewing discrimination complaints. 8 8 The Act applies to employers hav-
ing fifteen or more employees 89 and contains provisions relating specifi-
cally to employment agencies9" and labor organizations. 9' Generalization
is, of course, dangerous. Nevertheless, the state act basically conforms to
existing federal law in describing prohibited conduct. In some instances
the statute specifically addresses issues not clearly resolved under federal
law. For example, an employer may, but is not required to, provide health
insurance benefits for all abortions.92 Also, addiction to an illegal or con-
trolled substance and addiction to the use of alcohol are not treated as
handicaps. 93 In large part, however, an employer who has been in compli-
ance with federal law will be in compliance with the new Texas Act.
The new Act has brought major changes in the manner in which em-
ployment discrimination prohibitions are enforced. The state commission
created by the Act, rather than the federal Equal Employment Opportu-
81. Id. at 860-61, 79 L. Ed. 2d at 15.
82. Ch. 7, §§ 1.01-10.05, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws, 1st Called Sess. 37 (codified at TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1983)).
83. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 100 (Nov. 30, 1983).
84. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, §§ 1.01-.04 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1983).
85. Id. § 3.01.
86. Id. § 6.01.
87. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976).
88. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 1.02(1) (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-1983).
89. Id. § 2.01(5).
90. Id. § 5.02.
91. Id. § 5.03.
92. Id. § 1.04(c). An employer's health insurance plan must, however, provide health
insurance benefits for abortion if the life of the mother would be endangered were the fetus
carried to term. Id.
93. Id. § 2.01(7)(B).
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nity Commission, will provide the initial administrative review of com-
plaints filed by aggrieved parties. 94 Complaints must be filed within 180
days after the alleged unlawful practice. 95 The commission will determine,
after an investigation, whether reasonable cause exists to believe discrimi-
nation has occurred. 96 The commission has the authority to bring an en-
forcement action to effectuate the Act's purposes,97 and, in addition,
complainants may bring private actions after the expiration of time periods
similar to those in title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964.98 The
remedies available under the state act are generally those previously avail-
able under federal law.99
The Texas Commission on Human Rights Act will certainly be impor-
tant to every employer, but its impact is generally no broader than the
twenty-year-old Civil Rights Act of 1964. °0 The Act will not require em-
ployers to alter their practices dramatically. The same cannot be said,
however, for the impact of the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Otis
Engineering Corp. v. Clark.*° 1 This controversial decision may require
employers to make major changes in their manner of dealing with
employees.
Otis's employee, Matheson, had a history of drinking while on the job at
Otis's, Carrollton, Texas, plant. On the night in question, Matheson ap-
peared intoxicated and in danger of falling into the machine at his work
station. His superior suggested that Matheson go home and, according to
the majority opinion, escorted him to his car. Three miles from the plant
Matheson was involved in an automobile accident that killed two women.
The medical examiner found that Matheson had a blood alcohol content
of 0.268%, which, to say the least, indicated a highly intoxicated state.' 0 2
In an ensuing wrongful death action by the husbands of the deceased wo-
men, the trial court granted summary judgment for Otis on the ground that
as a matter of law Otis owed no duty with respect to the off-duty, off-
premises tort of its employee. The court of appeals reversed, 0 3 and the
supreme court affirmed.1°4
At issue in the supreme court was the principle that an employer is ordi-
narily liable for the off-duty torts of his employees only if they are commit-
94. Id. § 6.01(a).
95. Id.
96. Id. § 6.01(b).
97. Id. § 6.0 1(e).
98. Id. § 7.01(a).
99. Id. § 7.01(c)-(d).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1976).
101. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 100 (Nov. 30, 1983).
102. The medical examiner testified that the blood alcohol content indicated Matheson
had consumed an amount of alcohol representing some 16 to 18 cocktails if consumed over a
period of one hour or 20 to 25 cocktails if consumed over a period of two hours. The doctor
further testified that 100% of persons with that much alcohol exhibit signs of intoxication
observable to the average person.
103. Clark v. Otis Eng'g Corp., 633 S.W.2d 538 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1982).
104. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 103.
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ted on the employer's premises or with the employer's chattels. 10 5 The
supreme court concluded, however, that Otis had exercised "control" over
Matheson when his supervisor removed him from his employment assign-
ment. 10 6 This action was sufficient to render Otis liable for Matheson's
conduct after he left the plant. The court stated, "What we must decide is
if changing social standards and increasing complexities of human rela-
tionships in today's society justify imposing a duty upon an employer to
act reasonably when he exercises control over his servants."' 1 7 Relying
heavily on Prosser'08 and the conclusion that Matheson's supervisor had
engaged in an affirmative act by sending Matheson home, the court fash-
ioned a new standard of duty for all pending and future cases:
[W]hen, because of an employer's [sic] incapacity, an employer exer-
cises control over the employee, the employer has a duty to take such
action as a reasonably prudent employer under the same or similar
circumstances would take to prevent the employee from causing an
unreasonable risk of harm to others. Such a duty may be analogized
to cases in which a defendant can exercise some measure of reason-
able control over a dangerous person when there is a recognizable
great danger of harm to third persons. . . . Additionally, we adopt
the rule from cases in this Restatement area that the duty of the em-
ployer or one who can exercise charge over a dangerous person is not
an absolute duty to ensure safety, but requires only reasonable
care. 109
The court therefore remanded the case to the trial court for a determina-
tion of the reasonableness of the supervisor's actions.' 0 The court listed a
number of considerations that should bear upon the determination. The
court stated that the trier of fact should be allowed to consider the availa-
bility of Otis's nurses' aid station, whether it was possible for the supervi-
sor to telephone Matheson's wife or have another person drive Matheson
home, the reasonableness of merely dismissing Matheson early rather than
terminating his employment, and the foreseeable consequences of Mathe-
son's driving upon a public street in his stuporous condition."'I
Four justices dissented in a forceful opinion. The dissent first noted that
no court in any jurisdiction had ever held an employer liable for the off-
duty, off-premises torts of an intoxicated employee if the employer did not
contribute to the employee's intoxication. ' 2 Next the dissent demon-
strated that the precedent cited by the majority wholly failed to support the
extension of employer liability adopted by the court.' '3 Finally, and per-
haps of greatest interest to employers and their counsel, the dissent dis-
105. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND) § 317 (1964); see Pilgrim v. Fortune Drilling
Co., 653 F.2d 982, 985-86 (5th Cir. 1981) (applying Texas law and following Restatement).
106. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 102.
107. Id.
108. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 56 (4th ed. 1971).
109. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 103 (Nov. 30, 1983).
110. Id.
Ill. Id.
112. Id. (McGee, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 105-08.
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cussed the probable effects of the majority's holding.' 14
Although the dissent may be accused of overstating somewhat the Dra-
conian consequences that may befall employers by reason of the majority's
rule, two questions raised by the dissent certainly bear careful considera-
tion. First, it is not clear what action by an employer will constitute exer-
cising control over the employee." 5 The court gave no hint as to how an
employer may avoid exercising control over an intoxicated employee short
of leaving him at his work station, a danger to himself and to other em-
ployees. The facts in Otis represented a very minimal degree of control." 6
Indeed, as the dissent noted, the entire basis of the plaintiffs' claim was
that Otisfailed to control its employee. Second, the Otis opinion raises the
question of what steps an employer, who by its "affirmative actions" has
assumed the duty to prevent its employee from causing an unreasonable
risk to others, must take to fulfill that duty. As the dissent noted, the usual
practice among employers is to allow an incapacitated employee to leave
work. " 7 This course of action seems no longer permissible under Otis. As
the dissent stated, "In an attempt to do justice in this one case, the majority
has placed an impractical and unreasonable burden upon all
employers." ' 18
IV. FRAUD
Another major development in tort law came from the legislature in the
form of amendments to statutory provisions governing fraud in real estate
and stock transactions.' 19 The amendments were necessary to correct a
conceptually troublesome aspect of the statute. Prior to the legislative ac-
tion, section 27.01 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code clearly re-
quired that the plaintiff in a suit concerning real estate or stock fraud prove
a requisite mental state to recover against the person making the allegedly
false statement' 20 or promise. 12 ' On the other hand, a plaintiff could es-
tablish joint and several liability against a person who merely benefited
from the false statement or promise irrespective of that person's mental
state. 122 Thus in some instances a person who innocently and unknow-
ingly benefited from the wrongful act of another could find himself jointly
114. Id. at 108-09.
115. See id. (discussion of uncertainty as to what action constitutes control).
116. Some misunderstanding between the majority and dissent is apparent with respect
to the steps the Otis supervisor took at the time of sending Matheson home. The majority
stated that the supervisor escorted Matheson to his car and inquired whether he was able to
make it home. The dissent stated that the supervisor did no more than release Matheson at
the door of the plant. The dissent suggests that if the supervisor's actions were an "affirma-
tive act," then omission, nonfeasance, and inaction are no longer viable concepts in Texas
law. Id. at 108.
117. Id. at 108-09.
118. Id. at 109 (emphasis in original).
119. Fraud-Real Estate or Stock Transactions Act, ch. 949, § I, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws
5208 (codified at TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01(b)-(e) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
120. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01(a)(l)(A) (Vernon 1968).
121. Id. § 27.01(a)(2)(B).
122. Id. § 27.01(b) (amended 1983).
1984]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
and severally liable for the actions of the true wrongdoer. It is not difficult
to imagine a variety of circumstances in which the statute could work an
injustice.
One such situation presented itself in Carr v. Hunt, 123 a case decided by
the Dallas court of civil appeals. Although the facts of the case were com-
plex, the essence of the plaintiff's complaint in Carr was that he had been
induced to sell a particular tract of land in reliance upon false promises by
the buyer. The buyer in turn sold the land to a third party and failed to
perform his promises to the plaintiff. The tract of land subsequently be-
came more valuable, and so the plaintiff sought rescission of both sales,
relying on the unamended section 27.01. The plaintiff obtained a verdict
in the trial court based upon a jury finding that the second buyer know-
ingly benefited from the first buyer's false promises.
The appellate court held, however, that no evidence supported the find-
ing that the second buyer knew of the false statements or knowingly bene-
fited from the false promises.' 24 Nevertheless, the second buyer had
plainly benefited, albeit innocently, from the fraud and thus was arguably
jointly and severally liable with the party who made the false promises.
The court stated that such a result would be anomalous and held that sec-
tion 27.01(b) would not be read to allow rescission against bona fide pur-
chasers of real estate.' 25 The court supported its holding by finding a
conflict between the literal reading of section 27.01 and Business and Com-
merce Code section 24.02,126 which protects the title of a bona fide pur-
chaser without notice of his seller's fraud.
The legislature amended section 27.01 to correct the inequitable result
perceived by the court in Carr v. Hunt. Specifically, it amended subsec-
tions (b) and (c) of the statute to provide that a person who makes a false
statement or false promise is liable for actual damages.' 27 Such person is
also liable for exemplary damages if he makes the statements "with actual
awareness of the falsity thereof."' 28 Moreover, the legislature added a new
subsection (d), which provides:
A person who (1) has actual awareness of the falsity of a representa-
tion or promise made by another person and (2) fails to disclose the
falsity of the representation or promise to the person defrauded, and
(3) benefits from the false representation or promise commits the
fraud described in Subsection (a) of this section and is liable to the
123. 651 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
124. Id. at 880-81.
125. Id. at 881.
126. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.02 (Vernon 1968).
127. Id. § 27.01(b)-(c) (Vernon Supp. 1984). The legislature also deleted the measure of
damages previously set out in the statute. The statutory measure had been the difference
between the value of the real estate or stock as represented or promised and its actual value
in the condition in which it was delivered at the time of the contract. id. § 27.01 (Vernon
1968) (amended 1983). Presumably, the courts are now free to fashion whatever measure of
damages seems suitable to the circumstances.
128. Id. § 27.01(c) (Vernon Supp. 1984). The legislature removed the statutory limita-
tions on exemplary damages to twice the amount of actual damages. Thus the court are now
free to grant larger exemplary damage awards.
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person defrauded for exemplary damages. Actual awareness may be
inferred where objective manifestations indicate that a person acted
with actual awareness. 29
The changes in the statutory fraud section thus eliminate potential lia-
bility of a party who acts without knowledge of a prior fraud. On the other
hand, a party who benefits from a prior fraud, with knowledge of the
fraud, is considered equally culpable with the party who commits the
fraud. In this regard the new statute is much more in accord with common
sense principles. 130
V. LIBEL
In Golden Bear Distributing Systems v. Chase Revel, Inc.131 the Fifth Cir-
cuit wrestled with difficult questions of Texas libel law in a case in which
the literal statements in the allegedly libelous article were true, but the
overall impression they created was false. The defendant published an ar-
ticle describing an investment fraud lawsuit and various legal troubles of a
California company named "Golden Bear of California." The plaintiff, a
completely separate company known as "Golden Bear of Texas," operated
as a franchisee of the California company but had never been accused of
any wrongdoing. Nevertheless, the article referred to statements by the
Texas company's marketing director, and in describing the alleged fraud
of the California company, the article stated that "Golden Bear['s]
promises were consistent throughout the country."' 132 The jury found the
overall impression conveyed by the article was to impute falsely the fraud-
ulent conduct of the California company to the Texas company.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court judgment for the plaintiff. The
court held that the trial court properly submitted to the jury the question
of whether the article was defamatory even though it did not literally state
that the Texas company had engaged in any wrongdoing. The court
stated:
We conclude that the district court correctly followed Texas law in
submitting the article to the jury. . . . Since the overall import of the
article was capable of two interpretations, one of which was poten-
tially defamatory, it was proper for the trial judge to submit the article
to the jury. The jury found the overall effect of the article to be de-
famatory because the article imputed wrongdoing to Golden Bear of
Texas. 33
The court similarly reasoned that truth was not a defense in this instance.
Although the individual statements in the article about Golden Bear of
129. Id. § 27.0 1(d).
130. The legislature also added a new subsection (e) to § 27.01, providing: "Any person
who violates the provisions of this section shah be liable to the person defrauded for reason-
able and necessary attorney's fees, expert witness fees, costs for copies of depositions, and
costs of court." Id. § 27.01(e).
131. 708 F.2d 944 (5th Cir. 1983).
132. Id. at 947.
133. Id. at 948.
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Texas were true, the jury found the overall effect to be defamatory. The
court held that for the truth defense to apply, the defamatory interpreta-
tion of the article must be true.' 34
Finally, the Golden Bear court held that the plaintiff had overcome the
possible privilege defense 35 by a showing that the defendant had pub-
lished the article with reckless disregard for the truth. 136 Critical to af-
firming the jury's finding of recklessness was the evidence that after the
article was published Golden Bear of Texas contacted the defendant, of-
fered to prove it was innocent of any wrongdoing, and asked defendant to
print a retraction. The defendant refused to allow the plaintiff to present
such proof. The court held, without benefit of Texas authority, that the
refusal, together with the defendant's failure to conduct its own investiga-
tion to determine if Golden Bear of Texas participated in the investment
fraud, supported the jury's finding of recklessness. 137 This author submits
that in so holding the court needlessly went too far. 138 A rule that would
require publishers to entertain every offer to prove a published statement
incorrect at the risk of having the refusal of such an offer later submitted as
evidence of recklessness places an unreasonable burden on publishers.
Moreover, such a rule seems contrary to Texas law. It is an established
principle that a publisher's failure to investigate the truth of a statement
before publishing the statement is not evidence of malice.139 It is illogical
to suggest that the failure to investigate the truth of a statement after it is
published is not subject to the same legal principle. The author's state of
mind at the time the statement is published is the critical issue. ' 40 Only in
rare circumstances is the conduct of the defendant after the publication
relevant to the question of the publisher's state of mind at the time of
publication. 141
134. Id. at 949.
135. The plaintiff asserted a privilege defense on the basis of TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 5432 (Vernon 1958). The court held that the defendant failed to carry its burden to
show that the article was a "'reasonable and fair comment or criticism of . . . matters of
public concern published for general information.'" 708 F.2d at 949 (quoting TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5432, § 4 (Vernon 1958)).
136. 708 F.2d at 949.
137. Id. at 950. The court relied upon RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND) § 580A com-
ment d (1976), which states that "[u]nder certain circumstances evidence [of a refusal by a
publisher to retract a statement after it has been demonstrated to him to be both false and
defamatory] might be relevant in showing recklessness at the time the statement was pub-
lished." This author suggests that it is more than a small leap from the circumstances de-
scribed in the Restatement to the circumstances present in the instant case, in which the
defendant merely declined the plaintiff's offer to attempt to demonstrate that the article was
false and defamatory.
138. The court also made statements regarding the showing of malice, but these state-
ments were dicta since the court held that the defendant had not sustained its burden of
showing a defense of privilege and the plaintiff was not a public figure. See 708 F.2d at 949.
139. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. O'Neil, 456 S.W.2d 896, 901 (Tex. 1970).
140. See Gaines v. Cuna Mut. Ins. Soc'y, 681 F.2d 982, 989 (5th Cir. 1982); Foster v.
Upchurch, 624 S.W.2d 564, 566 (Tex. 1981).
141. The only circumstances suggested by the Restatement comment relied upon by the
court in Golden Bear involved conduct by a defendant who has actual knowledge after pub-
lication that the statement was both false and defamatory. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
(SECOND) § 580A comment d (1976).
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In Hajek v. Bill Mowbray Motors, Inc. 142 the supreme court held that the
constitutional right of free speech 43 forbids the prior restraint of a defam-
atory statement.'"4 The court therefore dissolved an injunction prohibit-
ing the defendant from driving about the community with the message
painted on his vehicle that the plaintiff had sold him a "lemon."
142. 647 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. 1983).
143. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 8.
144. 647 S.W.2d at 255.
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